American Foreign Policy: Interests or Ideologies?

Nations pursue core interests, elites pursue periphery interests.

Geopolitical forecasters struggle with the reality that while nation-states have compelling interests that transcend centuries, it is individuals who dictate policy. This complicates forecasts as the personality, prejudices, and gravitas of individual leaders greatly impacts a nation's policy preferences. As accounting for this layer of complexity is such a daunting venture, it’s little wonder that forecasters discount the impact of individuals.

There is a way, however, to reconcile the overarching imperatives of the nation-state with the particular policy preferences of leaders: distinguish core and periphery interests.

This framework can be seen as a sort of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs transposed onto foreign affairs: a nation-state must provide for the needs of its people through the provision of security from outside threats, easy access to food and water, opportunities for economic mobility, and ability to enter into meaningful community. Meeting these needs looks different for each country, but the imperatives remain the same. Periphery interests, on the other hand, are dictated by the cultural beliefs of the nation's elite class. When the nation sufficiently fulfills its core interests, elites are then free to shamelessly satiate periphery interests.

The past 30 years of American foreign policy are evidence of how elites vigorously pursue periphery interests once the nation’s core interests are satisfied.

This may seem odd at first. If Russia's interests are an enigma, then American interests are bouts of schizophrenia. Seriously, American foreign policy strategy is a bit of an oxymoron. There doesn’t seem to be a rhyme or reason for America's actions abroad. Its leaders appear motivated by pure impulse rather than by clear strategic thinking. If there is any deep thought that goes into American foreign policy, it doesn't go beyond "what will get me reelected?"

But there is a deep irony to America's schizophrenic foreign policy: America has been so successful in achieving its core geopolitical objectives that it can afford to act like a drunken sailor on the world stage.

Think about that. American power is so overwhelming that it can suffer foreign-policy blunders without significant consequences to its status as the world's sole superpower. That's not to say these setbacks don't add up over time. Certainly, America's relative power compared to the rest the world is diminishing at an alarming rate. Nevertheless, despite the missteps of the past few decades, America remains humanity's preeminent power.

So what are America's core geopolitical interests and what are elite passion projects? How do we tell the difference? The answer can be found first within the peculiarities of American geography and second within the pathologies of American elites.

The most exceptional thing about America isn’t its founding principles nor the spirit of its people, it’s its geography. There are more navigable water ways in the U.S. than the rest of the world put together. North America is home to the largest stretch of contiguous arable land on the planet. The U.S. not only controls most of that arable land, its inland water ways, the Mississippi River Basin, overlays perfectly. It's the Louisiana Purchase.

What's so astounding is this isn't the end of American geography. The U.S. hosts more natural deep-water ports than anywhere else in the world, and it borders both the Atlantic and Pacific which gives it a key advantage when it comes to trade. All these ingredients prime the U.S. for success as a great power. But geographic endowments aren't enough, there must be a strategy to capitalize on these blessings.

What's surprising is there are clear geopolitical imperatives which have driven American foreign policy since its founding. George Friedman, in his 2009 book The Next 100 Years, does perhaps the best job of highlighting these imperatives. The points are summarized as follows:

1. Achieve hegemony of North America.

2. Prevent any outside power from exerting influence in the Western Hemisphere.

3. Establish control of the maritime approaches to the U.S.

4. Achieve domination of the world's oceans.

5. Prevent the rise of any power capable of challenging U.S. naval supremacy.

Upon examining these objectives, it's truly remarkable to reflect upon the rapidity at which the U.S. achieved its core geopolitical goals. America declares independence from Great Britain in 1776. Within a mere 130 years, the U.S. controls the core of North America from the Atlantic to the Pacific, neutralizes any possible threat emanating from Canada or Mexico, ejects the Spanish from their colonial holdings in the Caribbean, and manages to become the world's premier industrial power. Fast-forward another 40 years: the sleeping giant is awake, the Arsenal of Democracy is operating full tilt, and the U.S. Navy rules the waves. Even the once mighty British Navy leases obsolete destroyers from the Americans in exchange for basing rights.

However, threats remain in the form of the growing power of the Soviet Union. Soviet manpower, industry, and natural resources, if merged with the demographic, technological, and manufacturing prowess of Western Europe, could pose an existential threat to the power of the U.S. Navy. Thus, America's Cold War strategy begins to evolve.

Although not explicit, the U.S. pursues a strategy of offshore balancing. Later popularized as containment, offshore balancing utilizes regional allies to counter the power of a possible regional hegemon. This is because only a true regional hegemon can build a blue water navy capable of challenging the U.S.

The strategy of offshore balancing is as American as baseball and apple pie. The U.S. just doesn't have the demography capable of waging sustained, large-scale warfare on the Eurasian landmass. The U.S. would rather use its industrial and technological heft to support local allies. Then, if the need arises, the U.S. can come in over the horizon like the Rohirrim charging to save Minas Tirith. This is precisely the strategy the U.S. employed in both the First and the Second World Wars. If it ain't broke, don't fix it.

For 40 years, the Americans and the Soviets square off against one another. For 40 years, humanity stands at the precipice knowing that a single miscalculation could result in nuclear annihilation. Then this reality vanishes as if it were but a dream. The Soviet Union's complete and utter collapse at the end of 1991 is so sudden and so complete that it utterly stuns humanity. The Cold War is over, so what now?

It's at this point that America, having accomplished its core geopolitical objectives, begins to pursue a foreign policy chasing after periphery interests rather than core interests. But what were these periphery interests? The answer resides in the pathologies that dominate the worldview of American elites.

Americans are often described as possessing a "missionary mindset". This is a cultural outlook that is traceable to early 17th Century Puritanism. Within the past 60 years, American presidents as varied as JFK, Ronald Reagan, and Barack Obama have each quoted Puritan preacher John Winthrop who described America as "a shining city on a hill". Indeed, many Americans see their nation as exceptional and charged with some greater purpose for all of humanity. This self-conception is deeply embedded within the American psyche.

Nowhere is this missionary mindset on display than with elite pronouncements seeking to make the world "safe for democracy". From Woodrow Wilson’s creation of the League of Nations, to the creation of the United Nations, to the declaration of “the End of History”, this dogma lurks in the background of American foreign policy. Yet, because the Soviet Union was such a threat to American security, it was impossible to pursue elite pet projects at the expense of America's core geopolitical interests. The implosion and fragmentation of the Soviet Union changes all of this.

The end of the Cold War presents American elites with an unprecedented opportunity: a chance with both the means and the opportunity to pursue periphery interests. And pursue they did.

American power in the 1990s is as close to omnipotent as ever experienced by any nation in history. From the creation of the World Trade Organization to govern global commerce upon the principle of free trade, to backing the creation of the European Union, to the financial harmonization agreements of the Basel Accords, to military intervention campaigns in Somalia and Kosovo, American elites and their European counterparts use this power to erect a new international order founded upon the principles of human rights, neoliberal economics, and liberal democracy.

The 2000s and 2010s witnesses a doubling down of this liberal international order. From the nation-building exercises of Afghanistan and Iraq, to NATO’s toppling of Muammar Gaddafi, to the admission of China into the WTO, to the Paris Climate Accords, American elites continue down the path of pursuing periphery interests. But history didn’t stop. America can only pursue periphery interests for so long, and we are at an inflection point.

The stark reality of the international situation is that the world is transitioning from a unipolar moment of absolute American hegemony to a fragmented, multi-polar order. The future of international relations will look more like the concert of Europe than the Cold War. The rise of China, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and the continuing chaos in the Middle East means that the ability of the United States as the global hegemon to enforce world peace is completely and utterly broken. The post-Cold War order is dead, elites just don't know it yet.

Great power politics is back with a vengeance. Consequently, America must once again prioritize its core geopolitical interests. The era in which elites could unequivocally pursue periphery interests is over. Every single elite pet project is dead.

As the United States comes to grips with the return of great power politics, there will be a fundamental re-structuring of America’s elite class. The status and prestige of today’s elites are predicated upon the continuation of globalization as we know it. Consequently, American elites will do everything they can to stymie change because their self-interests demand it.

It is in this tension between the self-interests of elites and the best interests of the nation that the future of American politics will play out.