The Wounded Bear's Last Stand

Russia's invasion of Ukraine is an act of fear and desperation, not strength.

In lieu of recent events, I’m interrupting my series on China’s political economy to address some topical issues with grave consequences to the future of globalization.

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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is unquestionably one of the most geopolitically significant events of the decade. The ramifications for the future of globalization cannot be understated. For the first time since WWII, a major power is engaged in full-scale war on the European Continent. The promise of permanently escaping the tragedy of great power politics is forever broken.

But there’s one lingering question in the minds of many observers: why did Russia choose to invade Ukraine? The answer is a paradox: Russia is acting out of fear and desperation, not strength.

To understand this conundrum, it’s useful to reflect upon the words of Winston Churchill who famously remarked, “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.”

Russian national interests are discoverable by inspecting its historic and geographic realities. 

Russia’s psyche is deeply shaped by its near-indefensible geography. There are two main invasion routes into Russia: the Eurasian Steppe, which stretches almost completely uninterrupted from Hungary to Manchuria, and the North European Plain, which stretches from the Pyrenees Mountains on the Franco-Spanish border to the Ural Mountains in the heart of Russia.

In the 12th Century, the medieval kingdom of the Kievan Rus, centered around Kiev and occupying much of western Russia, is destroyed and occupied by Mongol invaders traversing the Eurasian Steppe. When Muscovy emerges as a new sovereign territory in the 15th Century, it seeks to prevent a repeat of the Mongol nightmare through its subsequent invasions of Siberia and eventual domination of the Eurasian Steppe. 

Although the Muscovite (later Russian) state achieves remarkable success in protecting itself from invasion to the east, it suffers numerous near-catastrophic invasions from the west through the North European Plain. The Swedes in the 1700s. Napoleon in the 1800s. The Germans twice in the 1900s. In World War I, Russian defeat on the battlefield triggers the overthrow of the 204-year-old Romanov dynasty and results in the creation of the Soviet Union. In the second, invasion from Hitler’s Nazi war machine threatens the total annihilation of the Russian people.

With the exception of WWI, the logistical challenge of invading and occupying Russia, particularly in the winter, proves to be the undoing of invaders. These traumatic events impress upon Russia the importance of dominating the North European Plain and Eurasian Steppe to protect itself from hostile powers and to provide strategic depth in the advent of another invasion.  

Russia nearly succeeds in this objective following WWII. However, sensing a major geostrategic threat from the communist Soviet Union, the United States forms a global military and economic system to counter Soviet ambitions. Ironically, the formation of the American-led liberal order reinforces Russian fears of great powers amassing near its vulnerable borders.

After the fragmentation of the Soviet Union, the Russian people witness economic and political calamity. Virtually overnight, the population and territory under Russian control decreases by 52 and 24 percent respectively. From 1991 to 1999, the Russian economy contracts by an estimated 35.6 percent.

In the midst of this unprecedented collapse, Russians are fearful. In an attempt to assuage these fears, Bill Clinton’s Secretary of State Warren Christopher promises the Russian Federation that NATO will never expand eastward. Then, to Russia’s abject horror, NATO admits Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as members in 1999. Furthermore, NATO engages in an aggressive strategic bombing campaign against Serbia, Russia’s historical friend and ally. This is the same Serbia that served as the catalyst for WWI, and Russia’s opinion is never even considered.

From the Russian perspective, this expansion of American power into Russia’s historic Near Abroad represents an existential threat. It is for this reason that Vladimir Putin calls the demise of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”

But out of the ashes of catastrophe emerges the modern Russian state. After his rise to power in 1999, Putin's Russia experiences a dramatic reversal in fortunes. By the end of the 20th Century, Russia is economically destitute, politically unstable, and facing secession movements in the Caucuses. Fifteen years later, Russia’s economy grows by 94 percent, government order is restored, and the Caucuses are under firm Russian control. Yet all these successes feel threatened when events suddenly change in January 2014.

Throughout the 2000s, Ukraine lobbies the EU for some sort of trade agreement. Finally, in late 2013, a breakthrough appears. There’s just one problem: the Russians.

From Ukraine’s eastern border, it’s only a 300-mile jog to Kazakhstan, about the same distance as Washington, DC to NYC. Seizing control of this corridor would effectively cut off Russia’s access to key oil producing regions and to the Black Sea. It’s this Eurasian Steppe corridor that bore witness to some of WWII’s bloodiest battles. Names such as Stalingrad and Kursk are etched into history with the blood of millions of Russian dead. Under no circumstances can Russia allow Ukraine to fall under EU and American influence.

To the shock of the Ukrainian people, President Viktor Yanukovych refuses to sign a trade deal and alignment pact with the European Union in November 2013. Instead, Yanukovych opts to improve relations with Russia. Immediately, the Kremlin offers Ukraine a $50 billion aid package and cheaper energy prices.

With this news, protests erupt in Kiev in late November. Soon, barricades go up in the Maidan Square as protestors seek to defend themselves from Ukrainian military forces deployed to break up the protests. Russian assets join the Ukrainian authorities.

These barricades become the locus of a peaceful revolution. After months of tense showdowns that result in the deaths of over 50 Ukrainians, the government of Yanukovych is toppled on February 22, 2014, as Ukrainian security forces refuse to slaughter their fellow citizens.

Russia is absolutely furious at these events. To rub salt in the wound, U.S. Senators John McCain and Chris Murphy visit Ukraine to meet with Ukrainian opposition leaders during the Maidan Square protests. In the mind of the Kremlin, there is no doubt that the U.S. orchestrated these events.

Not taking this setback lying down, Russia executes a series of moves designed to alter the geopolitical balance of power. In rapid secession, Russia illegally annexes Crimea and initiates a proxy war in Eastern Ukraine. Furthermore, Russia does its best to tie down the Americans in the Middle East by intervening militarily to save the murderous Assad regime while simultaneously threatening NATO allies in the Baltics and conducting clandestine operations to sow discord during the 2016 American presidential election.

On the surface, it would appear these moves by Russia signify a growing strength and self-confidence. But beneath all the bluster is the reality: Russia is in terminal decline.

Just like Germany and China, Russia is getting old. Like, really old. That’s because the collapse of the Soviet Union didn’t just impact the economy, it impacted the Russian people’s willingness to survive past today.

While the willingness of couples to have kids varies for a plethora of reasons, there’s one issue that stands out above the rest: economics. If would-be parents are staring down the gun of economic ruin, there’s a lot of hesitancy to have kids. So, in the wake of Russia’s economic free fall in the 1990s, Russian birthrates plummet catastrophically. In 1987, the average Russian woman is having 2.2 kids, around replacement. Fast-forward 10 years to 1997 and Russian women are having only 1.2 kids. Such a decline in birthrates is apocalyptic for a society.

Unfortunately for Russia, this flirtation with oblivion is but the opening act.

Russia’s Great Depression 2.0 drives millions into depression. Alcoholism soars. Things get so bad that 25% of Russian men die before reaching 55. Since 1992, deaths have outnumbered births with the exception of 3 brief years from 2013-2015. And that’s if you believe Moscow’s official data. But even the Kremlin acknowledges Russia’s population could contract 9.1% by 2035. The Russian Federation is literally dying.

In addition to Russia’s demographic dance with death, the Russian economy is collapsing.

Since 2014, Russia’s GDP is down 28%. Comparatively, Russia’s standard of living is also down 28%. Remember how Costa Rica’s standard of living is higher than China’s? Well, Russia’s standard of living is only $10,126 compared to China’s $10,434. Furthermore, the national poverty rate is up to 12.1% in 2020 from 10.8% in 2013.

But the strange irony of Russia’s decline is a weakening Russia is a more dangerous Russia. With every passing year, Russia’s economy and demography worsens. Russia right. now. is as powerful as it’s ever going to get this century.

This is a reality not lost upon the new Russian Tsar, Vladimir Putin. In his autobiography, Putin reflects:

“There, on that stair landing, I got a quick and lasting lesson in the meaning of the word cornered. There were hordes of rats in the front entryway. My friends and I used to chase them around with sticks. Once I spotted a huge rat and pursued it down the hall until I drove it into a corner. It had nowhere to run. Suddenly it lashed around and threw itself at me. I was surprised and frightened. Now the rat was chasing me. It jumped across the landing and down the stairs. Luckily, I was a little faster and I managed to slam the door shut in its nose.”

This excerpt goes a long way in explaining the psyche of Russia’s despot, but what is known about the former KGB agent’s rise to political power is shrouded in mystery. Following the end of the Soviet Union, Putin serves in a variety of capacities for the St. Petersburg government. After his political benefactor loses an election, Putin moves to Moscow in 1996 where the next stages of his career are an enigma. All we have are the following details.

• Between 1996-1998, Putin advances quickly within the power hierarchy of the Kremlin.

• In July 1998, Putin becomes head of the FSB - the successor to the KGB.

• In August 1999, President Boris Yeltsin appoints Putin as Prime Minister, Yeltsin’s fifth PM in two years.

• In September 1999, a string of bombings across the cities of Moscow, Buynaksk, and Volgodonsk kills 300 Russians. The attacks are blamed on Chechen terrorist groups and serve as justification of the Second Chechen War.

• On New Year’s Eve 1999, Yeltsin unexpectedly resigns, making Putin acting President.

• In March 2000, Putin is elected to his first term as President of the Russian Federation.

This rapid rise to power baffles outside observers. There are too many “coincidences” that seem to align in Putin’s favor. Indeed, there is even strong evidence that suggests Putin is responsible for terrorist bombing attacks in Moscow, the event instrumental to his rise to power.

Putin’s death list goes on. It’s expected that he is responsible for the killing of multiple Russian dissenters such as Sergei Yushenkov in 2003, Paul Klebnikov in 2004, Alexander Litvinenko in 2006, Anna Politkovskaya in 2006, Natalya Estemirova in 2009, Stanislav Markelov and Anastasia Baburova in 2009, Boris Berezovsky in 2013, Boris Nemtsov in 2015, and Mikhail Lesin in 2015. In 2004, unknown agents poisoned Ukrainian politician Viktor Yushchenko who just so happened to hold views contrary to those of the Kremlin. Lacking all shame, Russian agents deployed nerve agents in middle of Salisbury, UK in an attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia back in 2018.

Putin is a bloodthirsty murderer.

Putin also styles himself as Russia’s contemporary savior. In an infamous speech days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin mourned the demise of the Russian Empire and declared a right to Russia’s “ancestral lands.” In doing so, Putin denied the existence of not just Ukraine, but also Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Poland. Putin’s speech represents an urge, not to merely establish a permanent a buffer zone in Ukraine, but a Nietzschean will-to-power seeking to create a new Russian Empire.

Russia’s justification for invading Ukraine is further proof of Putin’s megalomaniac power grabs.

In a playbook almost identical to Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Putin declared a duty to stop “genocide” in Eastern Ukraine. Indeed, Russia doesn’t acknowledge its actions in Ukraine as a war but, in true Soviet style, says it’s engaged in “special military operations.”

While there are some arguments that the invasion of Ukraine was inevitable due the threat of NATO and EU advances into Ukraine, these arguments deny the legitimate self-determination of the Ukrainian people. Ukraine finds itself threatened by a hostile neighbor that is much larger and more powerful. Of course it would seek allies in NATO and the EU! Ukraine merely seeks to protect its sovereignty from the newest iteration of Russian despotic tyranny.

The great tragedy of Ukraine’s situation is that it finds itself standing alone in the face of Russian aggression.

The harsh reality is that while the West cannot allow Ukraine to fall back under Russia’s orbit lest it enable Putin’s aims of reconstituting the Russian Empire, a direct Western involvement would trigger general warfare between Russia and NATO and risk nuclear escalation.

And so, while the West cannot intervene militarily, it will do everything short of military intervention to support the Ukrainian people’s defense of their homeland in the face of Russian invasion. This includes sending weapons, sanctioning oligarchs, and cutting Russia off completely from the global economy.

But there is something more at stake than just Ukrainian sovereignty, something that directly threatens globalization and modernity. The great question underpinning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is this: Can a nation use military force to rewrite the rules of the international system?

Globalization is the result of the Cold War American-led alliance system. But that structure is reliant upon a unipolar world. The resurgence of Russia along with the rising ambitions of China and Iran threaten the stability of the post-Cold War Order.

If Russia is able to successfully accomplish its aims in Ukraine, this would encourage Iran and China to possibly engage in their own military campaigns. And so, globalization’s future depends on the ability of Ukraine to inflict enough casualties and for the West to inflict enough pain on Russia’s economy so that other revisionist powers hesitate to begin their own conflicts.

The war in Ukraine is far from over, but it appears that Putin severely miscalculated by invading Ukraine.

Prior to invading Ukraine, Russia’s active-duty military estimated at 900,000. Four weeks into the war, Russian dead could be as high as 10,000. In modern war, it’s typical for there to be three times as many wounded as killed. That means there could be as many as 40,000 Russian casualties. Russia is about to burn through 5% of its active-duty manpower and it hasn’t even accomplished any major objectives yet.

Meanwhile, as major oil and gas companies suspend operations in Russia and the entire country is declared persona non grata by Western sanctions, Russia’s economy is likely to disintegrate in an eerie echo of the 1990s.

As the last flowers of Russian youth die in the fields of Ukraine and what’s left of the Russian economy implodes, it is possible Putin is beginning to recognize his blunder. Russia may never be able to conduct offensive ground operations again. There is no second Russian comeback story. But a wounded bear only becomes all the more dangerous.

The new Tsar may very well feel like he’s being cornered. Having risked his entire legitimacy on forcefully bringing Ukraine under Russia orbit, Putin is likely to escalate the conflict rather than back down. There’s no telling how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine ends, but one thing is certain: the war is going to get a whole lot bloodier and we’re nowhere close to the end.